Abstract This paper presents an efficient and side-channelprotected software implementation of scalar multiplication for the standard National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group binary elliptic curves. The enhanced performance is achieved by leveraging Intel's AVX architecture and utilizing the pclmulqdq processor instruction. The fast carry-less multiplication is further used to speed up the reduction on the Haswell platform. For the five NIST curves over G F(2 m ) with m ∈ {163, 233, 283, 409, 571}, the resulting scalar multiplication implementation is about 5-12 times faster than that of OpenSSL-1.0.1e, enhancing the ECDHE and ECDSA algorithms significantly.
Introduction
Most SSL/TLS communications start with a client-server key establishment, based on a public key cryptosystem. The classical protocol uses the RSA algorithm for encryption/decryption of a session key, but it suffers from the following drawback: the confidentiality of the sessions depends directly on the security of the server's long-term private RSA key. Especially motivated by recent disclosures, the current trends are to move to protocols providing (perfect) forward secrecy, such as the authenticated Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (DHE) key exchange. One approach is to use elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to efficiently perform this kind of key exchange (ECDHE). Similarly, ECC-based signature schemes (ECDSA) become attractive because of their relatively short keys. Thus, software implementations of ECC for the high-end server platforms become a target for optimization.
Protocols such as TLS 1.x support elliptic curves over both prime and binary fields, and the important cryptographic libraries include implementations for both types of ECC. For instance, the OpenSSL library that underlies the mod_ssl module of Apache, implements the ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA and other key agreement protocols over binary and prime fields. On the software implementation side, binary curves have been less efficient than their prime curves counterparts on high-end processors. This was mainly caused by the fast integer multiplication units compared to slow carry-less multiplication. In OpenSSL-1.0.1e for example, the prime curves outperform their binary counterparts by several magnitudes. Thus, most current implementations are using prime fields. However, it is interesting to note that from the hardware implementation cost, protocols using binary curves are cheaper to implement than prime field curves, which can be significant for low-end client devices. This paper focuses on software optimization of scalar multiplication over binary elliptic curves, leveraging the AVX instruction set and the newly optimized carry-less multipliers on high-end x86-64 platforms. Targeting performance and security by fast, side-channel-protected code, we built a library for the underlying binary field arithmetic for the common fields specified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), covering security level from 80 up to 256 bits as suggested in [18] . Table 1 shows the binary elliptic curves over G F (2 m ) (both random and Koblitz curves) that are optimized in this paper. On the left column, " 1 " indicates that the respective curve is standardized by NIST; " 2 " indicates a curve standardized by SECG; " 3 " indicates that the curve is part of the Wireless Transport Layer Security.
The improved 2P algorithm
Given an elliptic curve E with |E| = n ·h, where h ∈ {1 . . . 5} denotes the co-factor and n the prime order, the essential operation of elliptic curve cryptosystems is multiplying a point P by a positive integer k ∈ [1, n − 1], to obtain a new point
Montgomery [14] introduced a fast approach for multiplication for special curves over prime fields F p with p > 3. It uses the fact that the sum of two points whose difference is known, can be computed with a procedure that involves only the x-coordinate of these points when performing one point doubling, and one point addition per iteration. López and Dahab (LD hereafter) extended this algorithm for binary curves over G F (2 m ), by eliminating costly inversion operations in the field (when given in polynomial representation). In their so-called 2P-algorithm [13] , the point P = (x, y) is represented in the LD-projective form P = (X/Z , Y/Z 2 ). When P = P 1 − P 0 , the x-coordinate of the sum P 0 + P 1 and of 2P i is the fraction X /Z , where
The computational cost of the resulting algorithm is dominated by the performance of the point addition (Madd) and point doubling (Mdouble), which are executed log 2 (k) times in the scalar multiplication k P. Here, one can speed up the scalar multiplication by reducing the amount of computations in Madd and Mdouble.
Point doubling
According to the formulas given in [17] , Z 2 is multiplied with the precomputed value c = √ b. The result is added to X 2 , squared and the result X ← (X 2 +c · Z 2 ) 2 = X 4 +b · Z 4 obtained. This saves one squaring and one reduction operation for the Mdouble. Algorithm 2 shows the Mdouble flow for random curves.
For Koblitz curves, we have b = 1 and, therefore, c = b 2 m−1 = 1, so another multiplication and reduction can be saved as shown in Algorithm 3.
Point addition
The Madd function can be improved by deferring reduction operations (we call it lazy reduction, after [21] ). Algorithm 4 shows the improved Madd flow, where we defer the reduction after the multiplications in Steps 4 and 8, and reduce the result only in Step 10. Thus, one reduction can be saved by the cost of one addition. The rationale is that addition of double-sized operands with reduction afterwards is cheaper than two reductions and a single-field addition. The actual gain depends on the specific field. Table 2 compares the number of the field operations in Algorithms 2-4, to their original form. For simplicity, we count the reduction as a field operation here. Since the reduction is even more costly compared to a square (without reduction) in the binary field, its impact to the overall speed is significant. 
Estimating the impact of the improved Mdouble and Madd
3 Side-channel-protected scalar multiplication
This section discusses the potential threat and countermeasures of software side-channel attacks, where an adversary attempts to collect information about the secret keys that are being used. Today, it is known that software implementations of cryptographic primitives need to take such side-channel attacks into account, and add appropriate countermeasures.
Protection requirements
As with other cryptographic schemes, implementations of ECC have been shown to be susceptible to software sidechannel attacks. Even the applicability of remote timing attacks on an ECC implementation has been demonstrated [5] . We concentrate here on protecting the software implementation of the LD/Montgomery scalar multiplication, without covering the higher implementation parts of the various protocols like ECDHE or ECDSA. Timing attacks exploit the occurrence of variant execution times for different inputs. This kind of attack can be mounted whenever a correlation between the key and the execution time is found. Further, we take cache-based timing attacks into account, where the adversary is assumed to be able to run an unprivileged process to measure instruction and data cache latencies. Thus, key-dependent branches and table accesses should either be avoided or masked.
To avoid timing attacks in the LD/Montgomery scalar multiplication one must ensure that 1. All inputs (k,P) to the scalar multiplication function are valid, meaning
• k has constant bit length (for the same group),
• P is a valid point on the curve.
2. The scalar multiplication and its subfunctions are executed in constant time. 3. No key-dependent code branches or data accesses exist.
Protection strategy
The large variety of attacks makes it very difficult to protect an implementation against all possible side-channel threats.
In the following, we will show the mechanisms to protect against the previously mentioned threats for server implementations, whereas physical attacks such as power or radiation analysis techniques are out of scope. Constant key length is a first step to assert a constant running time of the scalar multiplication k P. Although, the input validation of the scalar k and the point P should be performed prior to the scalar multiplication, we provide a way to fix the bit length for all valid k ∈ [1, n − 1]. At first, we always add n to k, so that k = k + n and k P = k P. The bit length of k is then log 2 (n) ≤ log 2 (k ) ≤ log 2 (n) + 1, since the result of an addition of two integers n and k ≤ n is not longer than log 2 (n) + 1 bits.
To make the bit length fixed for all cases of k, one can repeat the addition of n, if and only if the bit at position log 2 (n) + 1 is NOT set. To ensure that the implementation does not include any branches, one should create a mask in a similar way as suggested in Algorithm 1 and then add the masked value, which is either the order n or an equivalentsized number with zero value. Thereafter, the bit length of k is fixed to log 2 (n) . One has to take into account that k needs to be a valid input to assert the fixed bit length, which is expected to be evaluated outside the scalar multiplication. This countermeasure introduces vulnerability to Carry-based attacks [7] , however, considering our attacker model this is no reasonable threat. Constant memory access pattern and the elimination of key-dependent branches are the main countermeasures against cache-based side-channel attacks in our implementation. Since cache attacks are most likely with our attacker model, we want to assure not only a fixed memory access pattern but also avoid any key-dependent branch. Therefore, we suggest Algorithm 1 to veil the data access.
Let t x 1 , t x 2 , tz 1 and tz 2 be fixed size temporary variables for a G F(2 m ) and k i the current key bit at position i. Table 3 shows the transition of the coordinates involved in the double/add process inside the LD/Montgomery scalar multiplication's key evaluation loop. 
For the proposed data veiling method, a masking word t 0 is created with either all bits set to zero, or all bits set to one, depending on the value of k i . This word is then used to create the mask for field elements in Step 2, which in turn is successively applied with AND and NAND operations to the two possible values, satisfying the rules in Table 3 . This transition is self-inverse and needs to be re-applied after the execution of Madd and Mdouble.
Algorithm 1: Proposed data veiling method
In summary, the proposed technique requires four field XORs, NANDs and ANDs, and, neglectable in proportion, one 64 bit subtraction and one constant load each. This sidechannel protection technique has been improved at the time of writing [15] .
Constant function calls inside the key evaluation loop are naturally provided by the LD/Montgomery scalar multiplication. In addition, we must ensure that all called subfunctions are executed in constant time and thus not include data depending branches. The function Mxy, which is the final transformation to extract the y-coordinate as described in [13] , is integrated in our implementation since OpenSSL uses the affine coordinate system. For applications that make no use of the y-coordinate, the final transition and thus the inversion can be omitted completely. The running time for the final transformation Mxy is not constant, if the result is invalid or the inverse −P of a point P.
Constant time implementation for binary field arithmetic is the necessary consequence from the previous point. If we want to ensure that the running time is constant, the binary field arithmetic must be totally data independent. This does not only mean that we cannot include any shortcuts for special values and data-dependent branches at all, but it also biases the choice of algorithm, e.g., the inversion method.
Efficient implementation of binary field arithmetics
In this section, we explain the techniques for the implementation of the binary field arithmetic. With special focus on fast reduction, we introduce a reduction scheme using the pclmulqdq instruction to speed up the reduction on the new Haswell architecture.
Binary field arithmetic
The square of a field element a(x) ∈ G F(2 m ), rather than just multiplying a field element with itself, can be computed as follows:
This property makes squaring in G F(2 m ) a linear operation and, therefore, much faster than the conventional multiplication, and can be performed with small table lookups. This table can be stored in only one vector and is, therefore, naturally accessed in a fixed pattern. Expanding the element by successively inserting zeros, it can even be computed in parallel, using the pshufb instruction. The use of pshfub to implement lookup tables was originally proposed by Gueron and Kounavis [8] and first used by Aranha et al. in [2] for squaring in G F (2 m ).
The multiplication in G F(2 m ) was usually a very expensive operation. The 64 bit carry-less multiplier, which is now available on various x86 platforms, significantly accelerates the multiplication in binary fields. In this work, we use both explicit and recursive versions of Karatsuba for different sizes. We chose explicit forms for 2-, 3-and 5-term Karatsuba and recursive forms for 4-, 7-and 9-term, balancing performance gain against code size. For a comparison of Karatsuba implementations with vector extensions see Su and Fan [19] .
For the inversion in G F(2 m ), we use the Itoh-Tsujii Algorithm (ITA) [10] . The ITA performs the inversion with exactly m − 1 squares and log 2 (m − 1) + H (m − 1) − 1 multiplications where H denotes the Hamming weight. The general recursive formula to obtain the chain can be given as
The number of squares in this algorithm is several magnitudes higher than the number of multiplications. Thus, the implementation of the squaring is of high importance for the inversion. In this implementation, the inversion is very costly, but required only once per scalar multiplication.
Reduction
The reduction is a very crucial part of the implementation and more costly than an addition. The two most important field operations, squaring and multiplication, both require a reduction with the reduction polynomial f (x) as given in Table 1 . In this work, we deal with the reduction polynomials defined by NIST and SECG, comprised of trinomials and pentanomials. In this section, we will describe strategies for each type and discuss special opportunities to speed up the reduction schemes with vector instructions.
The reduction is basically a multiplication of the upper half of a double-sized element with the reduction polynomial. Let f (x) = x m + r (x) with degree deg(r ) = k be the reduction polynomial over G F (2 m 
The reduction of c(x) is then computed as
In case the resulting polynomial c (x) has degree deg(c ) ≥ m, the reduction is applied recursively.
"Left-to-right in-place shift&add" is a fast approach to perform the reduction using vector instructions. Since the multiplication of a word by one bit is a simple shift, this multiplication can be applied as a series of shifts and adds. This approach makes especially sense, if we remember that the amount of bits in r (x) is very small (here either 2 or 4). In our experiments, this technique produced better results than other reduction schemes such as Barrett's method [11, 12] . In the following, the rightmost word is the least significant.
The reduction for trinomials is very straightforward-we successively shift the top word by the components of r (x) to the right and add the result to the remainder, while skipping multiples of 64 and 128 bit with memory alignments. To avoid duplication of work, one should execute the shift&add from the left to the right and adding the current word immediately to the remainder. Under the assumption that we are about to reduce a double quadword w by component x k , we shift w exactly (m − k mod 64) bits to the right and add it to the remainder while skipping l× 128 bits, where l = m−k 128 . If (m −k mod 128) ≥ 64, however, we need to add the lower half of w to the previous word. The strategy for pentanomials differs from the trinomial way in terms of recombination. Instead of directly adding each component to the remainder, we gather the results of left and right shifts of a vector A in separated vectors and recombine them by finally adding them to the remainder, which saves three alignments per 128 bit element. Figure 1 shows the combination steps for a vector A.
Fast vector shifting uses the (faster) 128 bit shift instruction (pslldq/psrldq), which is feasible whenever the difference of two components in the polynomial is a multiple of 8. With the polynomials from Table 1 , we can apply this trick for the polynomial f (x) = x 163 + x 7 + x 6 + x 3 + 1 where 163 − 3 = 160. In addition, we have the components x 10 and x 2 in the reduction polynomial for G F(2 571 ), but here the fast shifting interferes with the recombination strategy, where the savings for the alignment pay off in comparison.
Special reduction schemes are possible in G F (2 283 ) and necessary in G F(2 239 ). A fast reduction in G F (2 283 ) was proposed in [1] and uses the observation f (x) = x 283 + x 12 + x 7 + x 5 + 1 = x 283 + (x 7 + 1) · (x 5 + 1).
The polynomial f (x) = x 239 + x 158 + 1 is one of the two polynomials suggested in [18] for this field size and currently integrated in OpenSSL. For the implementation with vector extensions, this polynomial is suboptimal. This is caused by the small distance 239 − 158 = 81 < 128, which means that a 128 bit word of the remainder affects itself during the reduction, which makes shift and add reduction inefficient for this size. The G F(2 239 ) reduction is, therefore, provided in 64 bit mode only. When using vector extensions, the polynomial f (x) = x 239 + x 36 + 1 (which has also been suggested by SECG) is much faster. Another approach would be to implement the reduction with a special version of Barrett's method, which should increase the performance of this field significantly. However, due to these issues we do not recommend the use of this field. Reduction in G F (2 233 ) is much faster and this particular curve has almost the same security level with an only slightly shorter key. Anyhow, we added this curve to our implementation for completeness.
Mul&add reduction
The pclmulqdq instruction can be utilized for reduction. Thus, each 64 bit word of the operand c H (x) must be multiplied with r (x) = k i=0 r i x i and added to the remainder c L (x). Obviously, k must hold the condition k < 64 to ensure the lowest number of multiplications, which is exactly t = log 2 (c H (x) ) 64 then. If k > 63, we must multiply each word more than once, particularly s = k 64 times per word and we therefore, require t · s multiplications overall.
To spare the additional reduction step, as described above, the multiplications are executed from the left to the right and the results are immediately added to the remainder. Due to the fact that the bits of c(x) are results from either multiplication or squaring and are stored into a series of words where the border between c L (x) and c H (x) at position m − 1 is right in the middle of a 64 bit block, each multiplication result must be aligned to be added to the remainder. Therefore, we can either initially shift the polynomial r (x) to the left by l = m mod 64 bits (if k + l < 64 still holds), or we can shift the input words l bits to the right, or 64−l bits to the left. Thereby, the operand needs to be saved temporarily as the reduction is performed in-place, requiring more temporary variables. Shifting the operand especially makes sense if the data in c H (x) overlaps into an additional register, thus requiring t + 1 multiplications. For example the reduction in G F (2 163 ), the bits of c H (x) = 325 i=163 c i x i are spread over four 64 bit words. For our target curves, the operand shifting requires to much efforts compared to a single multiplication on Haswell, whereas on the Sandy/Ivy Bridge this shifting pays off. Obviously, the proposed technique makes more sense the greater the hamming weight of r (x) is, and if all the bits in r (x) are in one 64 bit word (s = 1). Fortunately, this is the case for the NIST curves over G F (2 163 ), G F(2 283 ) and G F(2 571 ).
As a matter of fact, the performance of the pclmulqdq reduction strongly depends on the underlying architecture. This reduction scheme starts to pay off when the multiplier performs two multiplications faster than the according shifts and additions. Let the reduction polynomial be pentanomial with no special properties as fast shifts or other special properties. For the "shift" step of the shift&add reduction, the required amount of operations for each 128 bit word is 4×2 SHIFT's (psllq/psrlq) plus 3×2 XOR's. Requiring the same amount of operations for the "add" step, the multiplier must be able to perform two multiplications faster than this to beat the shift&add implementation for pentanomial reduction polynomials. On the Sandy/Ivy Bridge, this cannot be performed faster than 10 cycles (usually more), whereas one 64 bit multiplication has a latency of 14 cycles. This explains why this reduction scheme does not pay off on these architectures. On Haswell, however, with a latency of seven and a throughput 1 of only two cycles, this can be performed in nine cycles. For the mul&add, one can take advantage of the small throughput by fetching multiple multiplications at once to gain even better performance.
Results
This section presents the results for the binary field arithmetic and shows the impact of the adjusted LD/Montgomery scalar multiplication and the resulting performance gain for both ECDH and ECDSA of the OpenSSL implementation. The corresponding tables can be found in the Appendix 1, 2. Since our implementation is suitable for several architectures, we provide data for a Haswell Core CPU at 1.00 GHz (HSW) and a Core i5-3210M Ivy Bridge (IVB), running with 2.50 GHz. Tests on a Sandy Bridge processor have produced very similar relative results as on the Ivy Bridge. To reduce randomness, we followed the guidelines from ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Systems (eBACS) [6] . The code was compiled with the latest gcc in version 4.8.1. As tools for measurement we used the OpenSSL built-in speed tool as well as a cycle counter using the RDTSC instruction, similar to [9] , with different repetition factors to increase precision. The OpenSSL speed utility can be used to reproduce our results after applying the patch and indicates the patch's impact to the overall performance of OpenSSL ECDH and ECDSA operations.
Binary field arithmetic costs are shown in Table 4 . The results indicate the benefits of the fast pclmulqdq on Haswell and the performance difference of squaring and multiplication.
Reduction costs can be found in Table 5 on the different architectures. It shows the performance difference of trinomials and pentanomials as well as the performance loss due to the 64 bit mode in G F (2 239 ). Furthermore, we see the mul&add reduction outperforming the shift&add reduction by 31 % in G F (2 163 ) and about 71 % in G F (2 283 ) and 80 % in G F(2 571 ) on Haswell. However, the shift&add implementation does not use AVX2 features, which could eventually allow improvements.
The computational costs for side-channel protection by hiding the coordinates to assure a fixed memory access pattern per round are also not neglectable. A single data veiling requires twelve logical operations at the cost of an XOR. In addition, one requires four temporary variables to hide the data processing for all four coordinates involved in the scalar multiplication. This has of course some performance impact The scalar multiplication's importance has been pointed out several times by now. Table 6 shows the results for k · P in cycles. We find that the amount of cycles has been substantially diminished, up to a factor of almost 12. Also, we observe the impact of the improved code flow for the Koblitz rather than random curves, which is noticeable in both absolute numbers and the relative speedup. Hereby, we have to mention that the numbers for the unpatched OpenSSL-1.0.1e are not constant, since it is not a constant time implementation, especially the bit length of k is not fixed. Therefore, the speedup factor is also not consistent and will differ from run to run.
Elliptic curve signature and verification algorithms have considerably more overhead than the ECDH. However, as shown in Table 7 , we perceive an average speedup of factors 3.9 (sign) and 5.0 (verify) on Ivy Bridge as well as 4.4 and 6.2 on Haswell, respectively. Since the bit length for the ECDSA in OpenSSL has been fixed before the scalar multiplication in response to a timing attack [5] , the resulting scalar k is not in the interval [1, n − 1] anymore and is either one or two bits longer (but constant for a specific field) than the original scalar (depending on the form of the corresponding curve order n), which slightly increases the amount of cycles for the patched version.
Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman operations are presented in Table 8 and Fig. 2 , measured with the OpenSSL speed tool and, therefore, the curve identifiers have been changed to nistk for Koblitz and nistb for random curves. Since the ECDH is basically a scalar multiplication, the speedup is very high. Prime curves are currently more frequently used in server implementations. As demonstrated in Table 9 , our improvements to the scalar multiplication of the binary curves result in a big performance lead.
Comparison to other works
Most works about the implementation of binary elliptic curves with the use of vector instructions are aiming to break speed records and thus often exploit algebraic properties. This work aims for provision of a generic library for binary field arithmetics as well as a fast scalar multiplication for the well-known NIST/SECG curves over those fields, without compromises in regard to security. This work does not use precomputation schemes (such as wNAF, τ NAF), point halving, special fields with beneficial properties (such as F q 2 ), or other algebraic properties (e.g., Frobenius morphism). Furthermore, the implementation is integrated into a real-world crypto library, which adds some overhead to the scalar multiplication, e.g., due to operand loading and memory management. The library for the binary field arithmetic can easily be imported into other cryptographic libraries. In Table 10 we show results for implementations of random scalar multiplication for binary elliptic curves in NIST/SEC fields on a single core.
This work yields similar results as reported in [20] for random curves on the Ivy Bridge, while adding the significant side-channel protection. It additionally benefits from the faster multiplication and mul&add reduction scheme on the Haswell processor, which results in a noticeable speedup on this architecture. For Koblitz curves, much faster results for a scalar multiplication are achieved by [1, 20] , which implement the 5-τ NAF scheme without side-channel protection.
For further comparison, we give the latest numbers of protected (as claimed by the authors) scalar multiplication implementations at the 128 bit security level, using curves with special algebraic properties. Bos et al. [4] report 117,000 cycles for a protected scalar multiplication on a Kummer surface with the Montgomery ladder and [16] reports 115,000 cycles on a GLS curve using 2-GLV (double&add) on a single core. At the same security level, this work achieves a scalar multiplication in about 138,000 cycles with the OpenSSL patch [3] on the Haswell processor, without using special fields, exploiting algebraic properties or precomputation techniques.
Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a fast, constant time implementation of the scalar multiplication on binary elliptic curves, standardized by NIST and SECG, at a security level of 80 bits and greater.
We analyzed major implementation threats for server environments and secured the implementation by applying countermeasures against common and dangerous side-channel threats such as cache and remote timing attacks. Over the last years, several publications have pointed out that these side-channel attacks are more than a theoretical, but a serious menace. To address this issue, we provide a constant time implementation of the elliptic curve scalar multiplication and binary field arithmetic, without key-dependent branches and a fixed memory access pattern.
In addition, we enhanced the implementation of the wellknown LD/Montgomery multiplication, provided a patch for the OpenSSL library and showed its significant performance impact. This improvement is available on all 64 bit architectures implementing at least SSE4 (better: AVX) and the pclmulqdq instruction. The implementation has been contributed to OpenSSL as patch for version 1.0.1e and is available for download [3] .
We further showed that this impact is not limited to the scalar multiplication itself, but improves the server's performance regarding ECDH operations and signature-based cryptography. This further leads to a major performance improvement for servers and clients conducting TLS handshakes. This is an essential enhancement especially for server environments, which are often required to conduct a big number of handshakes simultaneously. Also, our results might indicate a different view to the binary ECC on server architectures.
Appendix 1: Speed results
See Tables 4, 5 
